gramme), you write that the realm of practical questions in the post-conventional stage ofmoral consciousness is differentiated into two parts: .morality (Moralitiit) and Jnorals(Sittlichkeit) (Habermas, 1983a) . Moral questions can in principle be decided rationally under the aspect of the universalizability of interests or that of justice. Evaluative questions on the other hand appear under the most general aspect as questions ofthe good life(or of self-realization), and are accessible to a rational discussion Only within the unproblematic b()rizon of a historically concrete form of life or of an individual conduct pf life (Habermas, 1983a: 118) . One can also characterize this difference as the difference between norms pf acti()n and Vallie orientations.
You point out that this division leads to problems, because the connection between the two realms is lost and a mediation becomes necessary. Such a mediation can, however, only come about if the forms of life in the concrete lifeworld are sufficiently rationalized.
In this ·connection I would ·Uke to mention the recent · rieoAristotelian turn in the Anglo-Saxon world.This turn is a tea.ction to a one-sided 'c()mputational rational morality', to the predominant consequentiaHst moral theories and above all, to utilitarianism. In my opinion one can understand thisreaction as a renewed emphasis on concrete morals against. a consequentialist moral theory taken to extremes .,.... and perhaps one-sidedly rationalized.
My question now is how you view this development and, especially, whether itcan be fitted into your Kohlbergiantheoryof stages. The development I am speaking of c::ouldonthe ortebanq be a reactionary tendency, reaching back to traditional norms and values and attempting in this wa.y to taiDe modern rationality from the insufficiently ratiotullized lifew0dd. Here one could think· of Stuart ijf,llllpshire (1983: 99) , who ascribes moral force to prohibitions connected· with a •way of life' because 'it has ht history appeared natutat and on the whole still feels natural'.
On the other hand, we could be dealing with a hopeful tendency, with a sort of catchiM up in the rea.lm of morals. One could then understand theturntoa virtue ethics as an autonomous rationalization process of morals, as an approach to the rational working out of forms of life. Here one could think of theories such as those of G.J. Warnock (1971) or Bernard Williams (1985) ,even if Warnock is not a neo-Aristotelian in the strict sense, and Williams is more pes.:. simistic about the possibility of the rationalization under discussion here.
If such a rational theory of morals had once been developed """"' in the form of a rational theory of virtue, for instance -then it could be conllected to your discourse ethics forming a. more general normative theory ofaction. It does not seem a priori impossible to integrate questions of justice and questions of the good life once again into a broader action-theoretical perspective. But does that fit your theory? To sullll11arize: How do you view the latest neo-AJistotelian . turn and how do you unite it with yogr moral theory? image. Perhaps for the·sake of the conclusiveness of the argQmen• tation, this image is overly siniplified, so that juridification can be analysed as an apt example of colonializing tendencies.
Thus an runbiguous image oflaw results: the law is an institution, but it is also a result-oriented (orientiertes) control medium, which is jointly responsible for the colonization of the lifeworld. I would like to maintain in contrast, that even as a medium law remains primarily an agreement-()(iented (an Verstiindigung orientiertes) medium and thus belongs to the same group within your dualism of media as influence and value commitment. I would like to cite four reasons for this assertion. Firstly, law is linguistic, and comprehensive agreement is inherent to Jartguage as an immanent telos.
Secondly, law is characterized by the principles of legality, and in particular, principles such as generality, clarity, promulgation and freedom from contradiction have as a result thl!t valiclity claims of law are subject to critical exlimination and discussion (cf. Fuller, 1978) . Thirdly, law is Clipable of in~orporating certain normative principles of democratic government as legal principles, and thus has an immanent resistartce to encroachment on principles of this type (cf. Dworkin, , 1985 . Fourthly, law has developed recently in many cases into a more responsive and reflexive law, and these two legal types have at least a greater openness for thelifeworld and for democratic discussion in common (Nonetand Selznick, 1978; Teubner,. 1 983) .
For those reasons I reach the conclusion thatit is not completely impossible, but nevertheless quite improbable that law w0uld become a completely result-oriented controL01edium colonializing or participating in the coloriialization of the lifeworld. This· conclusion also has consequences for the entire juridification .debate.
lfweviewlaw as amedium which is immanently orientedtoward communication or even as an institution, then the expression 'juridification' acquires a different -and less negative -.ring. Thep we can distinguish Jour types of juridi(icatlon, of whlch only ohe is negative.
A first type is the juric,lification of those realms of the Hfeworld in which the media of power and money indisputably play a role: parental authority, the power of professors, the mliSS media. If a certain amount of juridificationoccurs here, then that appears only positive to me.
Asecond type is the juridification of those areas of the lifeworld which still rest on uncritically transmitted prejudices. Where for instance in the family sphere certain conceptions of thetoles ofmen and women still dominate, then one should in my opinion assent to their replacement by a rationalized law ~ such as a modem divorce ·law.
A third type is thejuridification of an already rationalized ·part of the Iifeworld by a less rational law. For instance, teaching and research at Netherlands universities are adapted to economic needs by.one centralized decree after the other. Your theory seems to refer only to this type ofjuridification, and only here do there appear to be negative consequences.
-A fourth type is the juridification of politics and the economy. To me this type also appears positive, because it replaces media not at all.oriented toward comprehensive agreement with one that is at least partially so oriented. That means the realm of the lifeworld enlarges. This does· not happen by the media of power and· money being coQipletely replaced, but by the subordination oftheir effects to certairt marginal conditions, through which the worst damage t() the lifeworld .can be avoided.
In this way a decidedly more positive image of law and juridification results than that which you draw in the second part of your Theory ofCommunic(ltive Action. This more positive analysis also seems more compatible with the first part of your Theory of Communic.ative Action and your recent essays.
Law and Morality froQI the Legal Perspective
Thus I bave reached my third theme: the. relationship between law and morality, as seen from the law. I would like to confine thisJopic to an important complex of moral and legal problems: the area of bioethics, in connection with which we have had now for several years ourCentre for>Bioethics and Health Law herein Utrecht. I am thinking her¥ of issues such as euthanasia, AIDS or animal experiJilelltation. II1 the area of bioethics there exists a considerable entanglemet)toflegalandrnoral probl¢ms.l..aw ahd.morafity are not yet always sharply differentiated. T}latis exactly the reason one can bring this area into relation your legal theory. because this theory maintains: but it mustalways remain connected to morality ,and a COJilSij:JerabJte. part of the sources oflegitimation for law lies in the feedback ~ procedura.listically conceived morality.
In this connection, I would like to. raise two questions .......... ,, •. ~re bioetbical questions actually questions which can and ..... ~~~,~ .... . van der Burg, Habermos on Low and Morality 109 be answered solely fmm a universalist rnonll point of view, or are they questions which ought to be reckoned with morals; because answering them is very much connected with personal life projects, with ways of life and concrete social situations. Even if we assume that one can arrive at satisfactory and relatively clear solutions in an ideal discourse situation, does it not stillbecome impossible to reach good results in concrete, real situations, because>ofthe fundamental contrafacticity ofthe ideal situation, ifthes~ results are based only on aprocedurallstic morality. Are we nottherefore compelled to appeal to concrete morals, if possible to a rationalized concrete morality? Put a bit more fundamentally: is the previously suggested synthesis of ethics and morality -the synthesis in a richer normativetheoiy ofaction -'""not virtually inescapable for questions of this kind?
Sec()ndly: is the circ\Jmstance that law, ethics and politics are so tigtttly ent(lngle<:Iin tljjs area an indication that they are insufficiently rationalized, a symptom of backwardness, or is the entanglement instead· the harbinger of a reflexive law, a legal system in which fundamental questions are solved as much as possible in discursive procedures between the parties or their representatives? Put another way: is it necessary to divide taw, morality and politics more clearly in order to solve these problems, or should we consider it positive that they are so tig!ltly entwined?
Law and Morality from the Moral Perspective In conclusion the fourth theme, the relaticmship between law and morality, as seen from the moral point of view. more precisely: the questions of political obligation and civil disobedience. In sever~l essays you have dealt with the '!lot autumn', the protest acticms in 1983 against the stationing of the newgeneration of nuclear weapons ill the Federal Republic, the so-called 'th(!ater nuclear modernization', which can now be eliminated (Habermas, 1983b) . It is striking that you appeal there to the Raw lsi an theory. It is doubtful to me that this quite narrow conception of civil disobedience fits well into your theory. Dworkin's (1985:107) words: does a universalist morality offer the possibility ofjustifying or criticizing 'integrity~ based civil disobedi~nce', a disobedience founded on individual or soeial integrity? To the extent of my knowledge, it is necessary that your moral theory -and perhaps your legal theory also -be expanded, so that morals can play a more important part in it.
Translated by Mark Ritter Note I owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor Robert Heeger, who criticized anct corrected this article.
